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In 1970, Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act 1 to
improve enforcement of the drug laws.2 The Act shifted the focus
of drug enforcement efforts from strict penalties against small-time
users to more severe punishment for drug peddlers.' As part of the
Act, Congress defined a new crime, "continuing criminal enter-
prise" ("CCE"), to serve as an additional vehicle to punish the
leaders of extensive drug networks." CCE is a compound crime. To
t A.B. 1988, Stanford University; J.D. Candidate 1994, The University of Chicago.
I The Controlled Substances Act constitutes Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970 ("CDAPCA"), Pub L No 91-513, 84 Stat 1236, 1242
(1970), Title II codified at 21 USC §§ 801-904 (1988).
2 See 21 USC § 801(6) (1988).
3 Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, HR Rep No 91-1444
(Part 1), 91st Cong, 2d Sess, reprinted in 1970 USCCAN 4566, 4570. The Supreme Court
has noted that the purpose of the statute is to punish the drug kingpins or "top brass" in
drug rings. Garrett v United States, 471 US 773, 781 (1985). See also Susan W. Brenner,
S.C.A.R.F.A.C.E.: A Speculation on Double Jeopardy and Compound Criminal Liability,
27 New Eng L Rev 915, 935-36 (1993) (statute targets "drug executives").
4 21 USC § 848 (1988 & Supp 1991). Under this statute, a person is engaged in a con-
tinuing criminal enterprise if-
(1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this chapter the
punishment for which is a felony, and
(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of this subchapter or
subchapter II of this chapter-
(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more other per-
sons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of organizer, a supervi-
sory position, or any other position of management, and
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources.
21 USC § 848(c).
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prove it, the government must show that the defendant committed
other felony violations, or predicate offenses, of the Controlled
Substances Act.
The compound nature of CCE has raised many questions
about a defendant's Fifth Amendment guarantee against being
placed in jeopardy twice for the same offense.5 The Double Jeop-
ardy Clause offers three constitutional safeguards. It "protects
against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It
protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after
conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the
same offense." 6 The crux of the inquiry into a potential denial of
any of these protections is often an examination of whether two
offenses are "the same offense." In the CCE context, the question
is whether CCE is "the same" as its predicate offenses.
In Blockburger v United States, the Supreme Court set forth
a test for determining whether cumulative punishment or consecu-
tive prosecutions for two statutory provisions violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause: two offenses are not the "same" for purposes of
the Clause if "each requires proof of a fact which the other does
not." 7 If all of the elements of one offense are included in the defi-
nition of another, then the first offense is a "lesser-included of-
fense" of the second." In general, once a defendant has been prose-
cuted or punished for one offense, he may not be prosecuted or
punished for a violation of the other.9
In the last two decades, the Court has recast the Blockburger
test as a method of construing Congress's intent, rather than inter-
preting it as a strict rule for finding a violation of the cumulative
punishment aspect of double jeopardy protection. 10 Under this ap-
"[Nior shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb." US Const, Amend V.
0 North Carolina v Pearce, 395 US 711, 717 (1969). See also United States v Dixon,
113 S Ct 2849, 2855-56 (1993); Albernaz v United States, 450 US 333, 343 (1981); Brown v
Ohio, 432 US 161, 165 (1977).
" 284 US 299, 304 (1932).
8 Brown, 432 US at 164, 168-69.
9 Id at 165, 168-69. Under certain circumstances, this rule does not apply. For example,
if all of the facts necessary to prove the greater offense had not yet occurred at the time the
defendant was prosecuted for the lesser offense, or if the government, exercising due dili-
gence, could not have discovered the greater offense, then the government may prosecute
the greater offense after prosecuting the lesser offense without violating the defendant's
double jeopardy rights. Id at 169 n 7.
10 See Ianelli v United States, 420 US 770, 785 n 17 (1975); Whalen v United States,
445 US 684, 691 (1980); Albernaz, 450 US at 337; Missouri v Hunter, 459 US 359, 369
(1983); Garrett, 471 US at 778-79; Dixon, 113 S Ct at 2882 (Souter concurring in the judg-
ment in part and dissenting in part).
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proach, the Double Jeopardy Clause "does no more than prevent
the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the
legislature intended."'" Congress can associate any reasonable pun-
ishment with a particular offense. 2 Accordingly, the double jeop-
ardy prohibition against multiple punishments does not prohibit
cumulative sentencing for a lesser-included offense if Congress in-
tended such a result. 3 If so, the offenses are not "the same" for
double jeopardy purposes. Thus, to analyze whether cumulative
punishment for conspiracy and CCE violates the prohibition
against double jeopardy, one must focus on what punishment Con-
gress intended.
The Supreme Court has applied a cumulative punishment
analysis in the CCE context twice. In Jeffers v United States, Jus-
tice Blackmun, writing for a plurality, decided that Congress did
not intend cumulative punishment for CCE and conspiracy.' 4 Al-
though a majority of the Court agreed that cumulative punishment
was prohibited, the justices split in their reasoning.15 Later, in
Garrett v United States, the Court considered substantive viola-
tions of the Controlled Substances Act as predicate offenses for
CCE 6 and determined that cumulative punishment was constitu-
tional in that context.'7 Although the Garrett Court distinguished
Jeffers instead of overruling it,'" Garrett seriously undermines the
reasoning of the Jeffers plurality. Still, every lower court to con-
" Grady v Corbin, 495 US 508, 516-17 (1990), citing Hunter, 459 US at 366.
12 The only constitutional limit to the punishment that a legislature may impose upon a
criminal offender is that the punishment may not be cruel and unusual. US Const, Amend
VIII.
" For example, Garrett allowed punishment for a predicate offense and CCE, but
nonetheless stated that a predicate offense to CCE is a lesser-included offense, because it
"does not require proof of any fact not necessary to the CCE offense." 471 US at 778. No
limitation on the powers of Congress prevents it from punishing greater offenses as well as
lesser ones included within them. Congress may set whatever level of punishment it chooses
for the greater offense; thus, it may split the greater offense into lesser ones and punish
those as well. Id at 778-79.
14 432 US 137, 155 (1977). Two different conspiracy provisions of the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub L No 91-513, 84 Stat 1236, 1291 (1970), may
serve as felony violations of the narcotics laws. See 21 USC § 846 (1988) (conspiracy to
manufacture or distribute); 21 USC § 963 (1988) (conspiracy to import or export). Section
846 appears in the Controlled Substances Act, Title H of CDAPCA; § 963 appears in Title
III.
15 See 432 US at 160 n 7 (Stevens dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in
part).
16 A "substantive predicate offense" is simply a non-conspiracy offense. See 471 US at
794. See also United States v Maza, 983 F2d 1004, 1009 (11th Cir 1993).
17 471 US at 790.
Is Id at 794-95.
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sider the issue of cumulative punishment for CCE and conspiracy,
either as a predicate offense or as a separate prosecution, has fol-
lowed Jeffers and disallowed cumulative punishment. 9
This Comment argues that cumulative punishment for CCE
and conspiracy is in fact constitutionally permissible. The deci-
sions not to allow cumulative punishment are based on inconsis-
tent and outdated reasoning that demands reconsideration. Section
I explores the reasoning underlying the current law that prohibits
cumulative punishment, focusing largely on Jeffers. Section II ar-
gues that the Garrett Court's analysis of double jeopardy under
the Controlled Substances Act should supplant the reasoning of
Jeffers so as to allow cumulative punishment. Section III argues
that post-Jeffers developments in the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO") indicate that cumulative punishment should be permit-
ted in order to effectuate congressional intent.
19 See, for example, United States v Rivera-Martinez, 931 F2d 148, 152-53 (1st Cir
1991); United States v West, 877 F2d 281, 292 (4th Cir 1989); United States v Schuster,
769 F2d 337, 345 (6th Cir 1985); United States v Possick, 849 F2d 332, 341 (8th Cir 1988);
United States v Hernandez-Escarsega, 886 F2d 1560, 1582 (9th Cir 1989); United States v
Rivera, 900 F2d 1462, 1478 (10th Cir 1990); United States v Reed, 980 F2d 1568, 1581 (11th
Cir 1993).
Although these courts agree that cumulative punishment for conspiracy and continuing
criminal enterprise is not allowed, they do differ with respect to their sentencing procedures.
See generally Note, Continuing Criminal Enterprise, Conspiracy, and the Multiple Punish-
ment Doctrine, 91 Mich L Rev 2220 (1993).
1 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit allows concurrent, but not consecutive,
sentences for both convictions, arguing that conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprise
are not alternative crimes, that the conviction for conspiracy may later have informational
value, and that Jeffers allows this result. United States v Bafia, 949 F2d 1465, 1474-75 (7th
Cir 1991), cert denied as Kerridan v United States, 112 S Ct 1989 (1992); United States v
Canino, 949 F2d 928, 949 (7th Cir 1991), cert denied, 112 S Ct 1701 (1992); United States v
Bond, 847 F2d 1233, 1238-39 (7th Cir 1988).
Other courts combine the convictions and impose a general sentence without vacating
the conspiracy conviction, claiming that such a sentence is consistent with Jeffers, that Con-
gress intended for the two convictions to stand, and that the procedure does not offend any
of the purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. United States v Aiello, 771 F2d 621, 633-34
(2d Cir 1985); United States v Fernandez, 916 F2d 125, 128 (3d Cir 1990); United States v
Grayson, 795 F2d 278, 287 (3d Cir 1986); United States v Gomberg, 715 F2d 843, 851 (3d
Cir 1983); United States v Gomez, 593 F2d 210, 217-19 (3d Cir 1979).
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently allowed an alternative sentencing
approach in which the conspiracy sentence would kick in if the conviction for continuing
criminal enterprise were later reversed. United States v Medina, 940 F2d 1247, 1253 (9th
Cir 1991), cert denied, 112 S Ct 900 (1992). This court was primarily concerned with losing a
conviction on appeal and decided that Congress intended for at least one sentence to be
carried out.
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I. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT LAW
When Congress created the continuing criminal enterprise of-
fense, it did not expressly state in the statute or in the legislative
history whether a conviction for CCE would result in punishment
in addition to, or in lieu of, punishment for predicate offenses.
Congress also did not state whether a conspiracy charge would
merge into a CCE charge. Thus, courts have resorted to various
means of statutory interpretation in order to divine Congress's in-
tent with respect to cumulative punishment. Courts have been al-
most unanimous in finding that Congress did not intend cumula-
tive punishment for conspiracy and CCE.20 In general, these courts
have adopted the reasoning of the plurality opinion in Jeffers v
United States.
A. The Facts of Jeffers
Garland Jeffers and five others created an enterprise known as
"the Family" to control drug traffic in Gary, Indiana.21 From 1972
to 1974, Jeffers exercised ultimate authority in the organization
with respect to both finances and discipline.2 2 The Family distrib-
uted heroin, earning revenues of about $5000 a day, with Jeffers's
personal share exceeding $1 million over the two years in which the
Family operated.23
A federal grand jury returned indictments against Jeffers,
charging him and nine others with conspiracy to distribute heroin
and cocaine, and adding a CCE charge against Jeffers alone. The
Government moved to try all of the charges together, but Jeffers
and his codefendants objected. The codefendants claimed that the
evidence presented to prove the CCE charge would confuse the
jury. Jeffers argued that many of the overt acts the Government
intended to offer in order to prove the conspiracy did not involve
him and would therefore be inadmissible to prove the CCE. The
district court denied the motion to try the cases together. 4
20 The Third Circuit has found that Congress intended for both convictions to stand.
United States v Fernandez, 916 F2d 125, 128 (3d Cir 1990). This may constitute multiple
punishment under Ball v United States, 470 US 856 (1985).
21 Jeffers, 432 US at 139.
11 Jeffers "exercised ultimate authority over the substantial revenues derived from the
Family's drug sales, extortionate practices, and robberies. He disbursed funds to pay salaries
of Family members, commissions of street workers, and incidental expenditures." Id. More-
over, "he maintained a strict and ruthless discipline within the group, beating and shooting
members on occasion." Id at 140.
23 Id.
24 Id at 140-43.
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The conspiracy counts proceeded to trial first. Jeffers was
found guilty of conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine and
sentenced to 15 years in prison and a fine of $25,000.25 ,The CCE
charge then went to trial, despite Jeffers's attempts to have it dis-
missed on double jeopardy grounds. Jeffers was again found guilty
and given the maximum sentence-life imprisonment and a
$100,000 fine.2 6 Before the Supreme Court, Jeffers argued that the
second prosecution violated his double jeopardy rights. A plurality
of the Court found that by objecting to the Government's motion
to try the conspiracy and CCE charges together, Jeffers had waived
his rights against double jeopardy. 7
Then, although neither party had raised the issue, the Court
considered whether the cumulative sentences violated the double
jeopardy protection against multiple punishment. A plurality of
the Court concluded that the two prison sentences for conspiracy
and CCE did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because they
did not exceed the maximum allowable under § 848, the CCE pro-
vision. However, as the cumulative fines were greater than the
maximum allowable for CCE, the Court ruled that the fines had to
be reduced so that they did not exceed the statutory maximum of
$100,000.8
B. The Plurality Opinion-Cumulative Punishment Disallowed
The Jeffers plurality advanced three primary arguments for
prohibiting cumulative punishment for conspiracy and CCE: (1)
the structure of the CCE statute leaves little room for cumulative
punishment in the form of consecutive sentences; (2) the legislative
history on cumulative punishment is inconclusive and therefore
does not support the conclusion that Congress intended the pun-
ishment to be cumulative; and (3) the dangers underlying each
crime present little need for cumulative punishment.29 Further-
more, the plurality found that Congress probably intended con-
spiracy to be a lesser-included offense of CCE (although resolution
of this issue was unnecessary to the decision).30
25 Id at 143 (violation of 21 USC § 841(a)(1)).
26 Id at 144-45.
27 Id at 153-54.
28 Id at 157-58.
29 Id at 156-57.
30 Id at 149-50.
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1. Structure of the statute.
In his plurality opinion, Justice Blackmun claimed that § 848
"reflects a comprehensive penalty structure that leaves little op-
portunity for pyramiding of penalties from other sections of the
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970." 31 The statute authorizes a maximum sentence of life impris-
onment, together with a fine and forfeiture of all profits, for a first-
time offender.3 2 This maximum penalty gives sentencing judges all
the upward flexibility they need to punish drug kingpins severely.
Additional punishment for conspiracy is unnecessary because Con-
gress allowed the maximum punishment possible for defendants
who run continuing criminal enterprises.33 Furthermore, noted the
plurality, § 848 forbids probation or parole and was the only drug
control statute that provided for mandatory minimum sentences.34
Finally, § 848 specified a maximum fine of $100,000, or $200,000
for second offenders.3 5 Since by definition a violation of § 848 in-
cludes other violations of the Controlled Substances Act, Justice
Blackmun concluded that "there would have been no point in
specifying maximum fines for the § 848 violation if cumulative
punishment was to be permitted."36
2. Legislative history.
Justice Blackmun then considered the legislative history of
§ 848 and found it "inconclusive on the question of cumulative
punishment.' 3 7 While Congress intended to punish professional
drug dealers severely, the penalty scheme for CCE "was to be sepa-
rate from the rest of the penalties."3 8 Because the legislative his-
tory did not specifically indicate whether defendants could be cu-
mulatively punished for conspiracy and CCE, the plurality found
"no reason to deviate from the result suggested by the structure of
the statute itself.13 9
31 Id at 156.
31 21 USC § 848(a) (1988).
11 Jeffers, 432 US at 157.
34 Id at 156.
11 The maximum fine is now $2,000,000. 21 USC § 848(a).
36 432 US at 156.
37 Id. See also United States v Chagra, 653 F2d 26, 32 (1st Cir 1981).
38 Jeffers, 432 US at 156 n 26.
39 Id. The court in United States v Sperling, 560 F2d 1050 (2d Cir 1977), inquired
further into the legislative history of the CCE provision. The court there found that CCE
was originally intended as an alternative sentencing provision for defendants "who engaged
in extensive violations of the narcotics laws.. . ." Id at 1057. However, in light of the dubi-
19941
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3. Dangers to be avoided.
The plurality in Jeffers then determined that the dangers
sought to be avoided by the two statutes did not require cumula-
tive punishment.40 The reason to punish conspiracy in addition to
its substantive object is that collective criminal action poses a
greater threat to society than individual action: "Concerted action
both increases the likelihood that the criminal object will be suc-
cessfully attained and decreases the probability that the individu-
als involved will depart from their path of criminality."'1  More-
over, partners in a conspiracy tend to complete more complex
crimes and are more likely to commit offenses in addition to those
the conspirators originally intended to commit.42 Because § 848 al-
ready prohibits this kind of conduct, the plurality concluded that
Congress had no reason to authorize cumulative punishment.43
4. Lesser-included offense.
Many courts have applied a Blockburger analysis-either as
an indicator of congressional intent or as a strict rule-to the two
offenses of conspiracy and CCE.44 The plurality in Jeffers consid-
ered a Blockburger analysis but declined to decide squarely
whether conspiracy was a lesser-included offense of CCE.45 In or-
der for conspiracy to constitute a lesser-included offense of CCE,
Blockburger requires that all of the elements of conspiracy be ele-
ments in the definition of CCE.4' Accordingly, the plurality consid-
ous constitutionality of some aspects of the original CCE proposal (which would have al-
lowed the use of hearsay without cross-examination, allowed the sentencing judge to with-
hold parts of the presentence report from the defendant, and would have placed the burden
on the defendant to show that his income came from sources other than drugs), Congress
amended the proposal to make CCE a distinct offense. According to the Sperling court, this
development indicates that "what originated as a harsh sentencing alternative remained as
such in the enacted statute, but with all our constitutional guaranties preserved." Id.
40 432 US at 157. See also United States v Gomberg, 715 F2d 843, 849-50 (3d Cir 1983).
But see United States v Fernandez, 916 F2d 125, 127-29 (3d Cir 1990) (because the conspir-
acy statute and CCE had different purposes, both convictions could stand, although the
total sentence may not exceed the maximum allowed under CCE).
41 Jeffers, 432 US at 157, quoting Callanan v United States, 364 US 587, 593 (1961).
42 Id at 157, quoting Callanan, 364 US at 593-94.
43 432 US at 157.
"' See, for example, United States v Aiello, 771 F2d 621, 634 (2d Cir 1985); Sperling,
560 F2d at 1054-55.
'45 432 US at 149-50 ("[W]e assume, arguendo, that... § 846 is a lesser included of-
fense of § 848."). The plurality found it unnecessary to decide the lesser-included offense
issue because the defendant had waived his double jeopardy rights against consecutive pros-
ecution by demanding separate trials for the conspiracy and CCE charges. Id at 153-54.
46 See Blockburger, 284 US at 304.
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ered whether the language of the CCE statute-which requires the
defendant to undertake a continuing series of violations "in con-
cert with" at least five others-was the same as the "agreement"
required for a conspiracy conviction. In rejecting the Government's
argument that "one professional criminal might have 'conned' five
innocent dupes into working for him," thus technically avoiding
any "agreement" while still acting "in concert with" others, the
plurality noted that the general meaning of the term and the legis-
lative history indicated that the words "in concert with" encom-
passed the traditional meaning of "agreement. 47 Thus, the Court
concluded that conspiracy was probably a lesser-included offense
of CCE.48 Most lower courts have adopted these dicta in holding
that conspiracy is a lesser-included offense and thus cannot be
punished along with CCE.49
C. The Other Jeffers Opinions
Justice Stevens, writing for himself and three other justices,
believed that conspiracy was a lesser-included offense of CCE:
"There is nothing novel about the rule that a defendant may not
be tried for a greater offense after conviction of a lesser included
offense."50 Because Justice Stevens would have barred the subse-
quent conviction, he also would have barred multiple punishment.
While he therefore agreed with the plurality that the cumulative
fines should be vacated, Justice Stevens provided no reasoning to
support the conclusion that neither multiple prosecutions nor mul-
tiple punishments were allowed. Instead, he concentrated on the
other principal holding of the plurality-that the defendant had
waived his double jeopardy rights by failing to demand one pro-
ceeding for both the conspiracy and CCE charges.5'
Justice White, on the other hand, believed that the Constitu-
tion permitted both the second conviction and the cumulative pun-
ishment.2 In a one-paragraph opinion, Justice White argued that
an earlier decision of the Court, Iannelli v United States,53 con-
trolled. In Iannelli, the Court held that a defendant could be con-
victed under both the federal conspiracy statute and a statute
Jeffers, 432 US at 148-49 n 14.
48 Id at 150.
" See, for example, the cases cited in note 19.
Jeffers, 432 US at 158 (Stevens dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in
part).
51 Id at 158-60.
"' Id at 158 (White concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
63 420 US 770 (1975).
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prohibiting gambling businesses involving five or more persons,
even when the conspiracy was to violate the gambling statute.54
The thrust of Iannelli was that Wharton's Rule, which requires a
conspiracy charge to be merged into its substantive object if com-
pleting the object requires more than one actor,55 did not require
the merger of the conspiracy and gambling charges, because of leg-
islative intent to the contrary.5 6 Furthermore, the two statutes sur-
vived the Blockburger analysis because the gambling statute did
not have an "agreement" as an element.57
The Government argued in Jeffers, and Justice White agreed,
that like the gambling statute in Iannelli, CCE did not require an
"agreement" and thus was not the "same offense" as conspiracy.8
Justice White also concluded that Jeffers's cumulative sentences
did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause because the prosecu-
tion did not use the conspiracy established at the earlier trial to
prove the continuing criminal enterprise charged in the subsequent
trial. Thus, Justice White did not agree that the fines had to be
reduced.5 9
II. ANALYSIS OF CUMULATIVE PUNISHMENT UNDER CURRENT LAW
Developments in the law since Jeffers suggest at the very least
that lower courts should reconsider their adherence to the plural-
ity's holding, and quite possibly that the Jeffers plurality was sim-
ply wrong to begin with-that it misread the Congressional intent
See id at 772 n 1, citing 18 USC § 371 (1970) (conspiracy); id at 772 n 2, citing 18
USC § 1955 (a)-(b) (1970 & Supp I1) (gambling business).
"s The commentator Francis Wharton, whose name this rule bears, originally formu-
lated the rule: "When to the idea of an offense plurality of agents is logically necessary,
conspiracy, which assumes the voluntary accession of a person to a crime of such a character
that it is aggravated by a plurality of agents, cannot be maintained." Francis Wharton, 2
Criminal Law § 1604 (Lawyers Co-op, 12th ed 1932).
1 Iannelli, 420 US at 786-91. The Court found much evidence of legislative intent to
the contrary. First, the basic purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 was to
eradicate organized crime by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with
those involved in organized crime. Congress enacted § 1955 as a weapon to combat the sub-
stantive evil of large-scale gambling operations. Second, the Court found that in drafting the
Act, Congress manifested an awareness of the distinct nature of conspiracy and substantive
offenses. In one provision, Congress identified "special offenders" as those who committed
specific felonies and as those who committed conspiracies. Moreover, Congress specifically
used the law of conspiracy to enhance penalties and remedies against those involved in or-
ganized crime. Finally, the definition of gambling activities in § 1955 did not refer to either
"conspiracy" or "agreement." The Court concluded that if Congress had intended to pre-
clude prosecution for conspiracy and § 1955, it would have said so explicitly. Id.
'7 Id at 785 n 17.
s' Jeffers, 432 US at 147, 158.
8' Id at 158.
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underlying the continuing criminal enterprise statute. First, the
Supreme Court in Garrett v United States reevaluated the lan-
guage, structure, and legislative intent behind § 848, reaching con-
clusions contrary to those of the Jeffers plurality.60 Applying the
reasoning of Garrett to the facts of Jeffers indicates that Congress
probably intended cumulative punishment for drug conspiracy and
CCE. Furthermore, the Court has rejected the use of the Block-
burger analysis for compound offenses such as CCE.
A. Garrett v United States
In 1985, the Supreme Court considered an issue closely related
to cumulative punishment for conspiracy and CCE. In Garrett, the
Court examined the double jeopardy implications of a CCE prose-
cution when the "facts underlying a prior conviction are offered to
prove one of three predicate offenses" necessary to establish a CCE
violation. 1 The Court concluded that double jeopardy did not pro-
hibit cumulative punishment for substantive predicate offenses
and CCE.
From 1976 to 1981, Jonathan Garrett directed an extensive or-
ganization that imported and distributed marijuana. In March of
1981, he was charged with importing marijuana and named as an
unindicted co-conspirator to a conspiracy charge. He eventually
pled guilty to the importing charge and was sentenced to five years
in prison and a $15,000 fine.2 Two months later, Garrett was in-
dicted for CCE and other narcotics offenses in a different district.
To prove the CCE, the Government introduced evidence of the im-
portation that had led to the earlier guilty plea. Garrett was found
guilty and sentenced to 40 years' imprisonment, to run consecu-
tively with his earlier sentence for importing marijuana. The Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to answer the question of whether
the second prosecution or the cumulative punishment violated the
principles of double jeopardy. 3"
Contrary to the Jeffers plurality, the Court in Garrett con-
cluded that the language, structure, and legislative history of the
Controlled Substances Act showed that Congress intended CCE to
be a separate offense punishable in addition to, and not as an al-
ternate for, predicate offenses. Thus, the Court held that cumula-
tive punishment in this context did not violate the Double Jeop-
so 471 US 773 (1985).
61 Id at 775.
62 Id.
11 Id at 776-77.
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ardy Clause. 4 The Garrett Court distinguished Jeffers but gave
little reason for doing so, claiming only that the "dangers posed by
a conspiracy and a CCE were similar," whereas the dangers posed
by the CCE and the underlying substantive offenses were not.6 5
Because Garrett strongly suggests that predicate offenses of all
kinds should be punished cumulatively with CCE, this distinction
may simply reflect the Court's refusal to reconsider the factual sit-
uation of Jeffers when it was unnecessary to do so.
The Garrett Court first explained that the language and the
structure of the statute clearly showed that Congress intended
CCE to be a separate offense. The statute was not drafted as a
recidivist statute. Rather, the Court found that the language of the
statute was aimed specifically at a particular problem-the threat
posed by the top leaders in drug operations. 6
The Court buttressed its language argument with an inquiry
into the statute's legislative history. This history showed that Con-
gress intended CCE to be a separate offense that could be pun-
ished separately.6 7 The Supreme Court recognized that the statute
was originally introduced as a recidivist provision, then amended
to make CCE a distinct offense. But rather than interpret the
amendment as evidence that Congress intended the statute to be
an alternative sentencing procedure, the Court saw the amendment
as an indication that Congress meant for CCE to be separately tri-
able and punishable.6 8 Furthermore, the debate in the House of
Representatives on the amendment focused on the distinction be-
tween providing for longer sentences and creating separate of-
fenses, indicating that Congress understood the difference between
the two and intended to create the latter.6 9
9 Id at 779.
65 Id at 794 ("The focus of the analysis in Jeffers was the permissibility of cumulative
punishments for conspiracy under § 846 and for CCE under § 848, and the plurality reason-
ably concluded that the dangers posed by a conspiracy and a CCE were similar and thus
there would be little purpose in cumulating the penalties.").
66 Id at 781-82.
67 Id at 782.
68 Id at 781-83.
69 Id at 783-84. See also HR Rep No 91-1444, 1970 USCCAN at 4651 (cited in note 3)
(Additional Views) ("Instead of providing a postconviction-presentencing procedure, "[the
amendment] made engagement in a continuing criminal enterprise a new and distinct of-
fense with all its elements triable in court."); 116 Cong Rec 33302 (1970) (remarks of Repre-
sentative Eckhardt) ("[Tlhe committee decided that the Dingell amendment should be cho-
sen over the original language ... [because] the Dingell amendment created a new offense
which would have to be triable in all its parts whereas ... the original bill ... provided
that some report upon which sentence would be based would be available to the judge
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After determining that Congress intended to create a separate
offense, the Court considered whether Congress intended CCE to
serve as an alternative punishment for the predicate offenses. Al-
though the legislative history was silent as to whether Congress in-
tended cumulative punishment for CCE and predicate offenses, the
Court was not surprised: "[S]uch a statement would merely have
stated the obvious. ' 70 Congress was giving prosecutors a new
weapon to use in addition to the already existing offenses. It there-
fore would not make sense for CCE to serve merely as an alterna-
tive sentencing provision, instead of as additional punishment for
big-time drug offenders. Congress thought of CCE as providing
further punishment for the most serious violators-those who
could not be punished enough with sentences for already existing
crimes. 71
Having determined that Congress intended to make CCE a
separate offense, the Garrett Court then adopted a presumption
that when Congress creates two distinct offenses, it intends to per-
mit cumulative sentences.72 Since the Double Jeopardy Clause
does no more than prevent a sentencing court from prescribing
greater punishment than Congress intended, Congress must have
been aware that unless it stated a contrary position, it was autho-
rizing cumulative punishment.73 Because this presumption is anti-
thetical to the Blockburger test, it is unclear exactly how far the
Court thought it could be carried. Taken to the extreme, this pre-
sumption may mean that a defendant could be punished for as-
sault and murder arising out of the same killing, or even for assault
and assault with intent to kill, if the legislature had codified these
as two distinct provisions. 74 A literal reading also calls into ques-
tion Whalen v United States, where the Court held that a defen-
dant convicted of rape and felony murder based on the rape could
70 471 US at 784. But see Albernaz v United States, 450 US 333, 341-42 (1981), where
the Court found that Congress legislated with Blockburger in mind. Thus, if two statutory
offenses survived the test, they were automatically separate offenses. By the logic of Al-
bernaz, the absence of any clear indication that Congress intended cumulative punishment
implies that Blockburger should govern.
71 471 US at 784-85.
72 Id at 793.
73 Id at 793-94, quoting Albernaz, 450 US at 341-42.
74 For example, in the Model Penal Code, assault is a lesser-included offense of murder,
but each appears in a different section. A person is guilty of assault if he "attempts to cause
or purposely, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another." MPC § 211.1 (ALI
1985). A person is guilty of murder if he purposely or knowingly causes the death of another
human being. MPC §§ 210.1, 210.2.
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not be punished for both. 5 Perhaps the best reading of the Garrett
presumption is that it only applies to provisions like CCE-for
which the legislature examined alternatives to making the offenses
separate and in the end created distinct offenses.
Finally, the Court found it problematic that if cumulative
punishment were not allowed, the fine allowed for CCE would be-
come a ceiling. 6 Because Congress established the large fines in
order to deprive drug dealers of their enormous profits, the Court
doubted "that Congress intended to force an election of a lower
maximum fine [by prosecuting for CCE rather than for the predi-
cate offenses] in order to attempt to obtain the life imprisonment
penalty available under the CCE provision."
7
"
B. Analysis of Conspiracy and CCE Under Garrett
Following the reasoning of Garrett, the plain language and leg-
islative history of both the conspiracy and CCE statutes-the stat-
utes at issue in Jeffers-indicate that Congress intended cumula-
tive punishment for violations of the two provisions. First, CCE
and conspiracy are two distinct offenses, which, under the Garrett
presumption, indicates that they should be punished separately.
Second, the language of the two relevant conspiracy provisions,
§ 846 and § 963,78 suggests no reason why conspiracy as a predi-
cate offense should be treated differently from a substantive of-
fense. Finally, the Garrett Court's interpretation of the legislative
history of the Controlled Substances Act suggests that Congress
intended cumulative punishment for conspiracy as well as substan-
tive predicate offenses.
1. Two separate offenses.
As the Supreme Court found in Garrett, the fact that Con-
gress intended to create a distinct offense is at least an indication
that the offense is intended to be punished separately from other
offenses. 79 The Garrett analysis, which resulted in the conclusion
that Congress created distinct offenses, applies just as well to con-
75 445 US 684, 693-94 (1980). Undermining Whalen may be the result that Justice
Rehnquist, who disagreed with that holding, intended. See id at 699 (Rehnquist dissenting).
See also text accompanying notes 124-27.
76 Garrett, 471 US at 794.
7 Id.
78 21 USC § 846 (1988) (conspiracy to manufacture or distribute); 21 USC § 963 (1988)
(conspiracy to import or export).
7 471 US at 784. See also Albernaz, 450 US at 336.
[61:197
Conspiring Drug Kingpins
spiracy as a predicate offense as it does to the substantive predi-
cate offense at issue in Garrett. The language of the CCE statute
"affirmatively states an offense for which punishment will be im-
posed."' 0 The statute imposes its own penalty rather than modify-
ing the penalty imposed for violations of the conspiracy provisions.
Furthermore, the Controlled Substances Act has its own recidivist
provision, indicating that CCE is a separate offense and not a re-
cidivist offense.8 The Court goes on to note that the CCE statute
is clearly aimed at the specific problem posed by the drug king-
pin. 2 Thus, Congress's creation of CCE as a separate and distinct
statute is evidence that it intended to punish conspiracy and CCE
cumulatively.
2. Language and structure of the statutes.
The language of § 846 and § 963 also leads to the conclusion
that defendants should be cumulatively punished for conspiracy
and CCE. Both sections state that persons who conspire to violate
specified drug laws are subject to the same punishment as if they
had completed the crime. 3 Since, under Garrett, a criminal who
commits a substantive predicate offense can be punished for both
the substantive offense and CCE, one who conspires to commit the
same offense should be subject to the same punishment. An earlier
version of § 846-the one under which the defendant in Jeffers
was sentenced-had specified punishment no greater than the
maximum allowed for the object of the conspiracy.s4 Congress
amended the statute in 1988, after the Supreme Court decided
Garrett, to permit the same punishment for a conspiracy as for
attaining the object of the conspiracy.8 5 Because Congress can be
assumed to know the law,86 it follows that Congress legislated with
Garrett in mind and intended for the amendment to result in cu-
mulative punishment for conspiracy and CCE.
80 471 US at 779.
81 Id at 881, citing 21 USC § 848(a)(1).
82 471 US at 881.
83 Section 846 provides that "[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit any
offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed
for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy." 21
USC § 846. Section 963 contains the same language but refers to a different subchapter.
84 21 USC § 846 (1976). See Jeffers, 432 US at 140.
85 "See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub L No 100-690, § 6470(a), 102 Stat 4377
(1988). There is essentially no legislative history for this amendment; none of the "Related
Reports" listed at 1988 USCCAN 5937 (collecting legislative history of the Act) contain any
mention of § 6470, the relevant amendment.
86 See Garrett, 471 US at 793-94, quoting Albernaz, 450 US at 341-42.
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A comparison of the CCE statute with statutes that may serve
as predicate offenses also shows that Congress may have intended
cumulative punishment. Congress did not specify a maximum
number of predicate offenses required for a CCE conviction.87
Thus, the sum of the fines authorized for the predicate offenses
could easily exceed the maximum fine allowable under § 848.88 For
example, § 841, which prohibits manufacturing, distributing, or
dispensing controlled substances, imposes fines from $100,000 to
$8 million. 9 Even one violation of this section, for example, a sec-
ond offense involving a substantial amount of drugs,90 can be pun-
ished with a fine much heavier than the maximum $2 million CCE
fine. Convictions for conspiracy under § 846 allow the same pun-
ishment as the completed crime under § 841.91 Thus, one convic-
tion of conspiracy to violate § 841 would allow a fine higher than
that allowed by CCE. Since Congress thought CCE would be the
most serious of the narcotics offenses, 92 it seems illogical for one
convicted of a conspiracy to receive a more severe sentence. In-
stead, Congress must have intended for the punishments to be cu-
mulative so that the drug kingpin remains the most severely pun-
ished of all drug offenders.
The structure of the CCE statute also refutes the argument
that CCE should be considered a "super-conspiracy," bf which
conspiracy is a lesser-included offense. Typically, a greater offense
is the more heinous crime and carries a higher penalty than its
included offenses. For example, under the Model Penal Code, mur-
der is a felony of the first degree,93 while manslaughter is a felony
of the second degree.9 4 A felony of the first degree carries a maxi-
mum punishment of life imprisonment (or the death sentence for
murder).95 A felony of the second degree is punished by a maxi-
mum of ten years."6 Thus, a defendant punished with the maxi-
mum sentence for murder would receive a higher sentence than a
defendant sentenced to the maximum for manslaughter. On the
87 See 21 USC § 848(c).
s Of course, because § 848 allows imprisonment for life, the only part of the sentence
at issue is the allowable fine. The Garrett Court was also concerned that the fine in CCE
would become a ceiling, a result not intended by Congress. 471 US at 794.
89 21 USC § 841(a)-(b) (1988).
90 21 USC § 841(b)(1)(A).
21 USC § 846 (1988).
82 See HR Rep No 91-1444 (Part 1), 1970 USCCAN at 4570 (cited in note 3).
's MPC § 210.2(2).
MPC § 210.3(2).
88 MPC §3 6.06(1), 210.2(2).
88 MPC § 6.06(2).
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other hand, as just seen, the maximum penalty for conspiracy may
be far greater than that for CCE. If CCE were a "super-conspir-
acy" provision, it should carry stiffer penalties than basic conspir-
acy statutes.
The structure of CCE also clarifies the applicability of the
Garrett presumption that two distinct offenses are separately pun-
ishable. If the elements and the penalty structure of a pair or set of
statutes suggest a lesser-included relationship, the Garrett pre-
sumption should not apply. The structure would override any evi-
dence that the legislature attempted to create two distinct of-
fenses. Thus, the structure of homicide statutes such as the Model
Penal Code, in which murder is manslaughter without the mitigat-
ing circumstance of "extreme mental or emotional disturbance,"
and in which murder is a first-degree felony while manslaughter is
a second-degree felony, suggests that cumulative punishment for
manslaughter and murder is not allowed. Indeed, the punishment
for murder necessarily includes punishment for manslaughter. By
contrast, although CCE arguably contains all the elements of con-
spiracy, 17 punishment for CCE does not necessarily include pun-
ishment for conspiracy, because the penalty for conspiracy may be
greater than that for CCE on the same set of facts. Thus, the
structure of the statute does not rebut the Garrett presumption
that Congress intends cumulative punishment when it creates two
distinct offenses.
3. Legislative history.
The legislative history of § 848 shows that Congress intended
to create a separate offense, separately punishable from other of-
fenses under the Controlled Substances Act. Garrett's analysis of
the legislative history reveals that Congress intended for CCE to
be an offense distinct from that of conspiracy. 8 For example, the
Garrett Court found significant the amendment of the original bill
from an enhanced-sentence provision for "special offenders" to a
distinct offense. 9
Furthermore, the legislative history shows that Congress
sought to avoid different dangers through each offense. Given the
' See Section II.B.5 for the contrary argument.
See text accompanying notes 67-69.
471 US at 783, citing Debate on Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control
Act of 1970, HR 1216, 91st Cong, 2d Sess, in 116 Cong Rec 33302 (Sep 23, 1970) (remarks of
Representative Eckhardt).
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lack of evidence on the intent underlying § 846,100 one can assume
that the conspiracy statute focused on the traditional dangers of
collective criminal groupings. Concerted action increases the likeli-
hood that a group will succeed in its goal and makes it less likely
that individual conspirators will renounce their criminal plans.
Concerted action also increases the probability that the group will
commit crimes outside the original criminal objects of the
conspiracy.10 1
On the other hand, Congress enacted § 848 with the particular
goal of punishing criminals who run extensive and successful drug
operations. In fact, Congress seemed primarily concerned with in-
dividuals, rather than groups. The original penalty structure re-
flects this concern. CCE punished the leaders of the crime syndi-
cates-those who held supervisory roles and who individually
obtained substantial income from the enterprise. 02 If Congress
had been concerned with the dangers of concerted action, it would
have had no reason to create a new offense. Simply increasing the
punishment for the conspiracy offense would have served that pur-
pose. 03 Instead, Congress created a new offense to punish the lead-
ers of profitable drug enterprises. The focus on individual culpabil-
ity in the CCE statute makes it easy to see how Congress would
intend to punish defendants both for agreeing to commit an illegal
act and for succeeding in committing such illegal acts on a "grand
scale."10 4
Finally, Garrett found that the legislative history gave no indi-
cation that CCE was to be a substitute for the predicate offenses
underlying a CCE charge. 10 5 With CCE, Congress intended to cre-
ate a new offense, separately punishable from other drug crimes.
Nothing in the legislative history indicates that conspiracy should
be different from substantive offenses, or that CCE is a substitute
for conspiracy. Since under Garrett any other predicate act may be
punished cumulatively with CCE, conspiracy should be treated the
same way.
100 The conspiracy provision is noted without discussion of purposes in HR Rep No 91-
1444, 1970 USCCAN at 4617 (cited in note 3).
101 See, for example, Wayne R. LaFave and Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law § 6.5(h)
at 567-68 (West, 2d ed 1984).
102 21 USC 848(b).
103 In fact, Congress did increase the punishment for conspiracy in 1988, when it pro-
vided that conspirators could be punished as severely as if they had completed the object of
the conspiracy. 21 USC § 846.
104 United States v Bond, 847 F2d 1233, 1238 (7th Cir 1988).
105 471 US at 784.
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4. Dangers protected against.
Garrett's summary distinction of Jeffers-that the dangers
against which conspiracy and CCE protect are different-makes
this issue an important aspect of the double jeopardy analysis.
While the Garrett Court conceded that it could be "reasonable" to
consider the dangers similar, 06 only four justices in Jeffers actu-
ally agreed on the similarity. 10 7 In fact, the Jeffers reasoning was
that conspiratorial behavior was already prohibited by CCE,108 rea-
soning which applies to any predicate offense. All drug felonies are
prohibited by CCE when the other elements of CCE are also
present.
Lower courts have rejected the Jeffers conclusion that the two
provisions protect against similar dangers. In so doing, one lower
court refused to adopt the holding in Ball v United States.0 9 In
Ball, the Court concluded that if Congress did not intend cumula-
tive punishment, then one of the convictions must be vacated be-
cause the conviction itself was excess punishment. 10 But, the court
of appeals in United States v Fernandez claimed that Congress
intended convictions for both conspiracy and CCE to stand, even if
it did not intend to allow cumulative prison sentences."' The pri-
mary argument in Fernandez was that Ball was inapplicable be-
cause the dangers sought to be avoided by conspiracy and CCE are
different, while the dangers in the statutes involved in Ball are the
same.1 2 Although unwilling to extend the argument to the conclu-
sion that all cumulative punishment is allowed, the court found
that at least the punishment imposed by a conviction without an
accompanying sentence did not violate the principles of double
jeopardy.1" 3
In distinguishing Ball, the Fernandez court compared the two
pairs of statutes involved in the two cases. The court found that
the statutes involved in Ball-receiving a firearm shipped in inter-
state commerce and possessing that same firearm-were overlap-
ping statutes which Congress had not directed against separate
evils. 1 4 On the other hand, the narcotics conspiracy statute and
100 Id at 794.
107 Jeffers, 432 US at 157.
108 Id.
-09 470 US 856 (1985).
110 Id at 864.
916 F2d 125, 127 (3d Cir 1990).
112 Id at 127.
113 Id.
1I Id at 126, citing Ball, 470 US at 864.
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CCE had different purposes: "While the conspiracy statutes punish
illegal agreements to import and to distribute and possess cocaine
with intent to distribute, the [CCE] statute provides for punish-
ment of persons 'trafficking in prohibited drugs on a continuing,
widespread substantial and supervisory basis.' ""5 If it is true that
the dangers protected against are not the same, then Garrett's dis-
tinction of Jeff ers fails, further suggesting that Jeffers was wrongly
decided.
5. Lesser-included offenses.
CCE and the conspiracy statutes survive a literal reading of
the Blockburger test. To recall, that test provides that two statutes
are different if each requires proof of a fact which the other does
not.116 CCE requires proof of five or more persons acting in con-
cert, substantial income, and a "continuing series of" predicate
felonies," 7  while neither conspiracy statute-§ 846 or
§ 963-does. In addition, the two conspiracy statutes require proof
of a felony object from their respective subtitles," 8 while CCE does
not."9 One who has committed a CCE has not necessarily violated
§ 963, nor has a drug kingpin necessarily violated § 846.120 While
some justices have rejected this interpretation of the Blockburger
rule,12' it may be close to the original understanding of Block-
burger,2 2 and Justice Rehnquist's opinions in recent cases suggest
that at least part of the Court is moving in this direction. 23
Even if conspiracy is a lesser-included offense of CCE, Block-
burger's presumption-that when the elements of one offense are
included in the definition of another, Congress did not intend to
allow cumulative punishment for the two offenses-may not apply
118 Id at 127, citing United States v Fernandez, 822 F2d 382, 384 (3d Cir 1987).
116 Blockburger, 284 US at 304.
117 21 USC § 848(c).
'19 See 21 USC §§ 846, 963.
119 21 USC § 848(c). For example, a CCE conviction could be based entirely upon im-
portation charges, which fall under a different subtitle.
120 One who violates the CCE statute has probably violated either § 846 or § 963 as
well.
121 See, for example, Justice Scalia's opinion in United States v Dixon, 113 S Ct 2849,
2856 (1993); Whalen v United'States, 445 US 684 (1980).
122 Blockburger cited Albrecht v United States, 273 US 1 (1927), as support for its test.
284 US at 304. In Albrecht, the Court found that possession of liquor and sale of the same
liquor were separate offenses because one could possess liquor without selling it, and one
could sell liquor without possessing it (by causing it to be sold). 273 US at 11. See also
Burton v United States, 202 US 344, 377 (1906) (one can agree to receive compensation
without receiving it, and receive it without previous agreement).
123 See, for example, Whalen, 445 US at 708-14 (Rehnquist dissenting).
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to compound offenses. The first evidence that Blockburger may
not apply to compound offenses arose in Justice Rehnquist's dis-
senting opinion in Whalen: "[T]he Blockburger test, although use-
ful in identifying statutes that define greater and lesser included
offenses in the traditional sense, is less satisfactory, and perhaps
even misdirected when applied to statutes defining 'compound'
and 'predicate' offenses."124 Justice Rehnquist's view prevailed in
Garrett-even though the Court thought that predicate offenses
were lesser-included offenses of CCE, cumulative punishment for
both offenses was Allowed-and secured further support last term
in United States v Dixon.2 5 While it is not clear whether this view
would prevail today,'26 Garrett, Dixon, and lower court RICO
opinions 27 make apparent at the very least that the Blockburger
doctrine has been undermined when applied to compound offenses.
Thus, even if conspiracy is a lesser-included offense of CCE, courts
following Garrett may not presume that Congress intended to dis-
allow cumulative punishment.
III. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS CALLING JEFFERS INTO QUESTION
Two changes in the law relating to punishment for compound
offenses provide further support for the argument that the Jeffers
reasoning should not apply to CCE and conspiracy charges, and
that courts should instead impose cumulative punishments on de-
fendants convicted of those two offenses. First, the promulgation
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines has rendered part of the Jef-
fers reasoning obsolete. Second, recent developments in RICO ju-
risprudence evince a trend toward permitting cumulative punish-
ment for enterprise and conspiracy offenses.
A. Federal Sentencing Guidelines
At the time of Jeffers, Justice Blackmun's analysis of
CCE-that the maximum punishment of life imprisonment does
not allow for pyramiding-seemed consistent with the legislature's
intent to punish drug traffickers severely." Congress intended
124 Id at 708.
"1 113 S Ct 2849. In particular, see the opinions of Justices Scalia, id at 2853, and
Rehnquist, id at 2865, who agreed that Blockburger governed the case but could not agree
on how to apply Blockburger to the compound offenses at issue.
128 The five different opinions in Dixon suggest disarray both in the application of
Blockburger and in the determination of when Blockburger should be applied.
127 See text accompanying notes 149-58.
128 Jeffers, 432 US at 156.
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§ 848 to "serve as a strong deterrent to those who otherwise might
wish to engage in the illicit [drug] traffic, while also providing a
means for keeping those found guilty of violations out of circula-
tion." 129 Although allowing the pyramiding of fines might serve as
an even greater deterrent, Congress's main focus was on the length
of the possible prison sentence, as it sought above all to remove
those who sold narcotics on a widespread basis* from the streets
forever. As Senator Byrd said, the purpose of the new offense was
to "remov[e] permanently from society one of the lowest forms of
criminal life.' 3 0 When Congress enacted § 848 in 1970, and even
when Jeffers was decided in 1977, the statute satisfied this goal by
authorizing a lifetime prison sentence for repeat drug offenders.' 3 '
The only restraint the original § 848 placed on the sentencing
judge was a $100,000 cap on the fine that could be imposed. 132
The subsequent promulgation of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines changed the structure of the CCE statute by reducing
the maximum sentence to less than life imprisonment for some vi-
olations. Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, courts must ei-
ther impose sentences within a particular range, or specify reasons,
also limited by the Guidelines, whenever they deviate from the
range.' 3 3 Under the Guidelines, sentences for violations of the Con-
trolled Substances Act are generally set according to the amount of
drugs involved.1 4 And, although the allowable sentences for CCE
are harsh, in some circumstances the sentence may be capped at
less than life, leaving room to cumulate prison terms ." 5 As a result
of this change in sentencing procedure, the Jeffers argument that
29 See HR Rep 91-1444 (Part 1), 1970 USCCAN at 4576 (cited in note 3).
116 Cong Rec 1183 (Jan 26, 1970).
21 USC § 848(a)(1) (1982).
... 21 USC § 848(a)(1) (1970). Repeat offenders could be fined up to $200,000. Id.
133 18 USC § 3553(b) (1988). See also Robert W. Haines, Jr., Kevin Cole, and Jennifer
C. Woll, Federal Sentencing Guidelines Handbook § 1A3-1A4 at 5-10 (McGraw-Hill, 1992)
("Guidelines Handbook").
"' See, for example, Guidelines Handbook § 2D1.1 at 165 and Sentencing Table, § 5A
at 462 (providing for 30 years to life imprisonment for possession of 300 kilograms or more
of heroin or 1500 kilograms or more of cocaine).
See id § 2D1.1 at 167-75, § 2D1.5 at 198, and Sentencing Table, § 5A at 462. While
in some of these cages the Guidelines may be correct in not authorizing consecutive prison
terms (for example, 20 years for conspiracy plus 30 years for CCE, for a total of 50 years), it
is only correct because in these cases the CCE sentence necessarily includes punishment for
the predicate conspiracy, which the Guidelines use to calculate the sentence for CCE. That
is to say, the CCE sentence is already cumulated. See id § 2D1.5 and text accompanying
notes 141-47. In any event, if the maximum sentence is less than life, by definition, there is
room to pyramid.
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§ 848 leaves no room for pyramiding sentences is somewhat
undermined.
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines also represent an interpre-
tation of congressional intent with respect to cumulative punish-
ment for CCE and conspiracy. Congress has delegated to the Fed-
eral Sentencing Commission the power to determine the amount of
the fine and length of the prison sentence to be imposed in crimi-
nal cases, as well as the determination of whether sentences should
run concurrently. 136 The sentences, of course, must be consistent
with the penalties allowed by the statutory provision outlawing
particular behavior.13 7
Thus, it appears that Congress has delegated to the Sentenc-
ing Commission the power to construe congressional intent with
respect to whether multiple punishments are allowed for violations
of two statutory provisions, and Congress has made such interpre-
tations binding on the courts: "The court shall impose a sentence
of the kind, and within the range [set forth in the Sentencing Com-
mission's guidelines], unless the court finds that there exists an ag-
gravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commis-
sion in formulating the guidelines .. ."I38 The Sentencing Com-
mission has interpreted the CCE and conspiracy statutes to allow
cumulative punishment by requiring predicate offenses to be used
in calculating the CCE offense. 39 If Congress did not intend cumu-
lative sentencing, then any consideration of the conspiracy in sen-
tencing for CCE should be impermissible 4 ° and therefore outside
the scope of the Sentencing Commission's delegation.
Application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines also suggests
that conspiracy and CCE should be cumulatively punished. First,
the base offense level for CCE is the sum of the levels for the un-
derlying predicate offenses plus an additional penalty.'4 ' The
Guidelines also treat conspiracy and substantive sentences identi-
cally: the punishment for conspiracy, whether as an independent
conviction or as a predicate for CCE, 142 is the same as if the object
136 See 28 USC §§ 994(a)(1)(B) and 994(a)(1)(D) (1988). See also Mistretta v United
States, 488 US 361, 374, 390-91 (1989).
137 See 28 USC § 994(b)(1).
138 18 USC § 3553(b).
139 Guidelines Handbook § 2D1.5 at 198.
140 See, for example, United States v Bafia, 949 F2d 1465, 1473-75 (7th Cir 1991).
Guidelines Handbook § 2D1.5.
112 Id. Until 1992, the Guidelines only included substantive predicate offenses in calcu-
lating the offense level for CCE. Guidelines Handbook §§ 2D1.1, 2D1.4, 2D1.5. Moreover,
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of the conspiracy had been completed.143 The defendant serves all
of his sentences concurrently. 4 4 Thus, a defendant convicted on
one count of manufacture, one count of distribution, one count of
conspiracy under § 848, and CCE based on the other three preced-
ing offenses will have four convictions and four sentences. The
CCE sentence will be the sum of the sentences for the other three
offenses plus an extra penalty; all the sentences will run
concurrently.145
The Guidelines advocate punishing a conspirator as if he had
completed the object of the conspiracy.146 This approach is consis-
tent both with the language of § 846 and § 963 and with some of
the modern theories of punishing conspiracy, which suggest that
two elements of the conspiracy require punishment: the agreement
and the object.147 While punishment for CCE includes a penalty
for the agreement, it may not reflect the object of the conspiracy.
Thus, for the punishment to fit the crime, the defendant should be
sentenced cumulatively for both conspiracy and CCE.
'Furthermore, failure to enhance a sentence for conspiracy
would be inconsistent with congressional intent. Sections 846 and
963 and the Guidelines express Congress's intent: the defendant
must be punished for the object of the conspiracy. Sentencing for
CCE without including the substantive object of the conspiracy
would result in a lighter sentence than Congress intended for con-
spirators and organized crime leaders. Thus, when imposing a sen-
tence on a defendant convicted of both CCE and conspiracy, courts
should use as the base offense level the sum of each of the predi-
cate offenses, including the object of the conspiracy, and the addi-
tional penalty for CCE. Because the Guidelines also retain the in-
because every Court of Appeals to address the issue has concluded that a conspiracy may be
a predicate offense, it is appropriate to consider the object of the conspiracy in sentencing.
See, for example, United States v Fernandez, 822 F2d 382, 384-85 (3d Cir 1987); United
States v Young, 745 F2d 733, 750 (2d Cir 1984). See also United States v Bond, 847 F2d
1233, 1238 n 1 (7th Cir 1988) (not deciding the issue, but citing cases).
143 Guidelines Handbook § 2D1.1 at 165. However, the Guidelines also state that all
drug offenses should be grouped together for sentencing purposes. If more than one guide-
line can be used to calculate an offense level, the greatest base offense level shall be used to
determine sentencing. Id §§ 3D1.1-3D1.3. Thus, the Guidelines may require different treat-
ment when a defendant is convicted of conspiracy, the completed crime, and CCE.
144 Id § 5G1.2.
145 It is less clear whether the Guidelines authorize cumulative fines. Under Guideline
§ 5E1.2, the sentencing court may impose a fine up to the statutory maximum. Id § 5E1.2.
Thus, in some cases, fines for separate offenses may need to be cumulated in order to effec-
tuate Congress's intent.
246 Id § 2D1.1 at 165, 196.
14" See, for example, MPC § 5.05(1).
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dividual convictions for the predicate offenses, 148  the overall
sentence reflects both the defendant's role in the conspiracy and
his criminal enterprise. This is the only result that is consistent
with congressional intent; is it also within the ambit of the
Guidelines.
B. Cumulative Punishment in the RICO Context
A comparison of cumulative punishment for conspiracy and
CCE to the RICO conspiracy and enterprise offenses 149 also adds
weight to the theory that cumulative punishment under the Con-
trolled Substances Act does not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Most commentators who examine the issue of double jeop-
ardy as it pertains to CCE compare it to RICO (and RICO conspir-
acy), since both crimes require predicate acts, and both were en-
acted to combat organized crime. 15  Since Garrett, most courts
have found that RICO enterprise and RICO conspiracy offenses
may be punished cumulatively,' 5 1 and that RICO conspiracy and a
predicate offense may be punished cumulatively. 52 Thus, the
148 Guidelines Handbook § 5G1.2.
149 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations provisions specify:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income. . . from a
pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such
person has participated as a principal ... to use ... any part of such income ... in
acquisition of any interest in. . . any enterprise which is engaged in. . . interstate or
foreign commerce ...
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain. . . any interest in...
any enterprise which is engaged in . . . interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by. . . any enterprise engaged in
. . . interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate . . . in the conduct of
such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity ....
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions
of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
18 USC § 1962 (1988).
1o See, for example, Twenty-Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United
States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals, 1991-1992, 81 Georgetown L J 853, 1240-
1244 (1993); Anne Bowen Poulin, Double Jeopardy Protection Against Successive Prosecu-
tions in Complex Criminal Cases: A Model, 25 Conn L Rev 95, 132 (1992); Susan W. Bren-
ner, Of Complicity and Enterprise Criminality: Applying Pinkerton Liability to RICO Ac-
tions, 56 Mo L Rev 931, 990-1005 (1991) (using CCE analogy in RICO context); Comment,
Double Jeopardy, Complex Crimes and Grady v Corbin, 60 Fordham L Rev 351, 351 n 2,
362-64 (1991) (same).
11 See, for example, United States v West, 877 F2d 281, 292 (4th Cir 1989); United
States v Watchmaker, 761 F2d 1459, 1477 (11th Cir 1985). But see United States v Sutton,
642 F2d 1001, 1040 (6th Cir 1980) (en banc) (holding that where evidence of RICO conspir-
acy and violation is identical, the two charges must merge for sentencing).
152 See, for example, United States v Pungitore, 910 F2d 1084, 1107-11 (3d Cir 1990).
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RICO cases suggest that Jeffers may be decided differently if
heard today.
More than one court has held that the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not bar cumulative punishment for RICO conspiracy
and a predicate conspiracy offense.1 53 Although these cases are not
dispositive in the drug context, their more modern reasoning is
readily applicable. For instance, United States v Pungitore deter-
mined that the same reasoning underlying the Court's decision in
Garrett allowed cumulative punishment for RICO conspiracy and
a conspiracy predicate offense.154 Pungitore relied on an earlier
case in the same circuit, United States v Grayson, that had ap-
plied the Garrett logic to RICO and substantive predicate offenses
and had found cumulative punishment constitutional.' Grayson
held that the language and legislative history of RICO suggested
that Congress sought to allow cumulative sentencing for predicate
offenses and RICO offenses (including RICO conspiracy).15 6
Pungitore could find "no principled way to distinguish [conspir-
acy] from [the earlier predicate offense] .''57 The court reasoned
that the legislative intent that allowed cumulative punishment for
RICO and its underlying predicate offenses applied equally well to
conspiracies as predicate offenses. 58 This reasoning also applies to
the parallel crimes of conspiracy and CCE: if the legislature in-
tended cumulative punishment for CCE and substantive predicate
offenses, it probably intended it for conspiracy predicate offenses
as well.
CONCLUSION
The Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit cumulative
punishment for conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprise.
While a plurality of the Supreme Court held in Jeffers v United
States that Congress did not intend to allow cumulative punish-
ment in this situation, developments in the law since that decision
have severely undermined the Jeffers reasoning. Because these de-
velopments have always distinguished Jeffers, and because Jeffers
has never been expressly overruled, lower courts have continued to
'3 Id. See also United States v Kragness, 830 F2d 842, 863-64 (8th Cir 1987); United
States v Mitchell, 777 F2d 248, 264 (5th Cir 1985) (finding that drug conspiracy and RICO
conspiracy were "separate offenses" under Blockburger).
1564 Pungitore, 910 F2d at 1108 n 24.
15 795 F2d 278, 286 (3d Cir 1986).
156 Id.
157 910 F2d at 1108 n 24.
158 Id.
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follow Jeffers rather than permitting cumulative punishment for
conspiracy and CCE.
These recent developments suggest that Jeffers should be re-
examined and reversed. The analysis of CCE in Garrett supports
this view. The language, structure, and legislative history of the
CCE statute, as well as the two conspiracy statutes in the Compre-
hensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, show that Con-
gress intended for CCE to be an offense separate from each of the
narcotics conspiracy statutes. Furthermore, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines allow the conspiracy to be considered in calculating the
sentence for CCE and then allow a sentence for conspiracy to run
concurrently, providing further evidence that Congress intended
for the two offenses to be punished cumulatively. Finally, courts
applying Garrett in the RICO context have permitted cumulative
punishment for RICO conspiracy and conspiracies as predicates to
the RICO enterprise.

